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THE GHOST OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PAST
Philip J. Weiser*
THE C REATION OF THE MEDIA: P OLITICAL ORIGINS OF M ODERN
C OMMUNICATION. By Paul Starr. New York: Basic Books. 2004.

Pp. xii, 484. $27.50.
When the canon for the field of information law and policy is
developed, Paul Starr's1 The Creation of the Media will enjoy a
hallowed place in it. Like Lawrence Lessig's masterful Code and Other
Laws of Cyberspace,2 Starr's tour de force explains how policymakers
have made a series of "constitutive choices" about how to regulate
different information technologies that helped to shape the basic
architecture of the information age. In so doing, Starr displays the
same literary and analytical skill he used in writing the Pulitzer Prize
winning The Social Transformation of American Medicine, the first
hand experience he gained as one of the founders of The American
Prospect (a successful left-leaning policy magazine), and, presumably,
the policy savvy gained from years as a Clinton White House aide.3
In short, Starr's The Creation of the Media explains how the
different segments of the information industries - newspapers, the
telegraph, the telephone network, and the radio industry - emerged
into their modern form. In so doing, it weaves together a compelling
narrative of how intellectual property policy (namely copyright and
patent law), First Amendment law, antitrust law. telecommunications
regulation, privacy protection, and government spending policy all
came together to form a coherent and distinctive information policy.

* Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado. B.A.
1990, Swarthmore; J.D. 1994, New York University. - Ed. Thanks to Nestor Davidson,
Kyle Dixon, Ellen Goodman, Dale Hatfield, Clare Huntington, Adam Peters, Paul Starr,
Heidi Wald, and Joe Waz for helpful comments and suggestions.

1. Professor of Sociology, Princeton University.
2. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). In his
introduction, Starr acknowledges the close connection between his work and Lessig's. See
pp. 6, 403 n.4.
3. In a considerable stretch that sought to link his White House service and the Creation
one of his reviewers claimed that the Creation of the Media could be
understood as an argument in favor of the Clinton health care plan that Starr helped to
develop. See Nicholas Lemann, Spheres of Influence: How the Government Helped Build
America 's Media Might, NE W YORKER, Apr. 12, 2004, at 84.
of the Media,
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To underscore its point, the book draws several pointed contrasts with
European countries and Canada, which made fundamentally different
policy choices from the United States that, in turn, gave rise to very
different market structures. Finally, because Starr's historical account
ends in 1941, his book leaves open for interpretation how to apply the
various insights it offers to modem policymakers.
Starr's work comes at a fortuitous time for American information
policy, as Congress is poised to reexamine the basic policy choices it
made in enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996.4 Like Lessig,
Starr's fundamental argument is that policy choices matter because
they help shape network architectures, industry structure, and the path
of technological and economic. development. All too often, however,
today's zeitgeist downplays the importance of such policy choices,
suggesting that either technological or economic factors are solely
responsible for the evolution of the information industries. To
challenge this view, Lessig's Code underscored that the Internet did
not emerge as a natural, fully formed instrument of communication
nor would it have developed as it did (or at all) without government
oversight.5 In The Creation of the Media, Starr provides the historical
counterpart to Lessig's Code, underscoring that Lessig's contemporary
arguments are well rooted in history and that there is a com
pelling case for addressing information policy as a coherent whole,
rather than simply as a collection of doctrines that work in
individual contexts.6
For today's policymakers, the fundamental information-policy
challenge is to develop a coherent regulatory regime for the Internet
4. See Stephen Labaton, Telecom:
N.Y. TIMES, Dec 6, 2004, at C13.

8-Year-Old Basic Law May Be Outdated Already,

5. In so doing, he challenged the policy consensus of the time - reflected in the Clinton
Administration's Report on Electronic Commerce - that the government should avoid
regulating the Internet with the notable exception of enforcing strong intellectual property
rights. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 27-29 (1997). Despite the rhetoric of the Clinton Report, some
policymakers, such as FCC Chairman Powell, acknowledged the force of Lessig's argument.
See FCC Commissioner Ponders Extent Of Regulation Among Rivals on Internet, 77
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 417, 417 (1999) (quoting then-FCC Commissioner Michael
Powell as stating that "if you don't believe that [current] regulatory choices . . . have a direct
and indirect effect on the development of the Internet, you're really missing something"
(omission in original)). Others, in line with the Report's antiregulation rhetoric, expressed
shock at the thought of regulating cyberspace. See Lawrence Lessig, Innovation, Regulation,
and the Internet, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27, 2000, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/
Vll-10/lessig-1.html.
6. For a sampling of the debate on whether information policy constitutes a unique legal
field, compare Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Mif(ht Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207. For my argument for a coherent and broad vision of
information policy, see Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2002).
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age. As Starr's historical narrative reminds us, the evolution of the
Internet will not merely be the result of technological determinism
and market ordering.7 To be sure, technological forces and private
commerce will be critically important in shaping the Internet's
development. But like many of the technologies Starr discusses
(newspapers, the telegraph, and radio), the Internet was nurtured by
government subsidies and it developed as it did - as an open platform
for innovation - because of regulatory decisions made by the
government, such as ensuring that the telephone lines that carried
Internet traffic did not favor certain applications or uses over others.8
Even though Starr's narrative closes with the end of the formative
era for radio broadcasting in 1941, his analysis highlights a series of
important issues that are relevant to today's information-policy
debates. Notably, Starr argues forcefully that the American tradition
of information policy embraced ways of facilitating next-generation
technologies by preventing entrenched incumbents (e.g., Western
Union, which controlled the telegraph) from blocking the emergence
of a new upstart (e.g., AT&T, which sponsored the rollout of the
telephone). Moreover, Starr explains that the United States declined
to follow the model of other governments that took control of the
early revolutionary technologies, such as the telegraph and the
telephone, often as part of a "PTT" (Post, Telephone, and Telegraph)
agency. Finally, Starr highlights how early policy decisions laid the
foundation for the modem structure of the radio and television
industries as well as their regulation.
This Book Review proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the
essential economic argument that Starr develops through his historical
narrative. Part II suggests that Starr's focus on market-power concerns
and the importance of an open architecture is a valuable starting
point, but an imperfect guide to modem policymakers. Part III
analyzes the complicated relationship between the public and private
sectors' roles in the creation of the media, highlighting the significance
of Starr's argument that the United States enjoys a tradition of public
support for the media while, in contrast, it views skeptically the
rationale for public ownership of the instruments of communication.
In so doing, Part III explains that Starr fails to underscore the insights
of public-choice theory, which highlights that private actors use
governmental regulation as a tool for protecting their profits (or rents)
and limiting competition. Finally, Part IV turns to the question of

7. Starr explicitly makes this point in his preface and introduction. See pp. xi, 3.
8. For a careful discussion of many of those choices, see Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on
the Giant: How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the
Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1999).
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whether and how policymakers can learn from Starr's account to
promote localism and diversity in media policy.
I.

O F PLATFORMS AND NEXT-GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES

Contrary to those who view the media as equivalent to the
reporting of news or, perhaps, the news and entertainment industry
(with the ever-blurring lines between them), Starr embraces a very
broad conception of the media, including the postal service, the
telegraph, and telephone as fundamental instruments of the mass
media. By conceptualizing the media in such broad terms, Starr
develops a comprehensive portrait of American information policy
and draws important parallels among the different industry segments.
In particular, each segment of the media industry that Starr describes
faced notable challenges related to the mass adoption of its
"platform," both with regard to attracting users and application
developers, and with regard to whether it would be undermined by an
established incumbent. In general, Starr concludes, the adoption rate
and success of new communications technologies in the United States
makes our communications system the envy of the world and part of
the secret of our nation's success.
A. A Truly American Revolution
Starr's account of American information policy argues that it
constituted a true revolution from the established order. In particular,
Starr suggests that the revolutionary spirit of 1776 embodied a
democratic commitment to sharing information broadly throughout
the American population (or at least among the enfranchised
population of property-owning white men). Consequently, on Starr's
view, the uproar in reaction to the Stamp Act in 1765 was no
accidental point of disagreement between the colonies and the United
Kingdom. Rather, Starr depicts the American commitment to the
flourishing of a free press, and the aversion to the special taxation
thereof, as a fundamental break from the continental tradition.
As Starr recounts \\'.ith great eloquence, the United States took
several steps to codify its commitment to a free press and a robust
sharing of ideas. First, the United States established an extensive
postal network that, on Starr's account, was a part of a constitutional
strategy for democratic self-government.9 And the extensiveness of the
9. P. 3; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (providing to Congress the authority "(t]o
establish Post Offices and post Roads"). Notably, American constitutional scholars have
rarely, if ever, appreciated that the Constitution's mention of this commitment is part of a
deliberate strategy for self-government. Consider, for example, that Professor Tribe's
canonical treatise devotes no discussion to this clause's significance. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000)
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U.S. postal system quickly outstripped its European counterparts, with
seventy-four post offices per 100,000 inhabitants by 1828 compared to
seventeen offices in the United Kingdom and four in France (p. 88).
Second, consistent with the First Amendment's commitment to a free
press, Congress instituted a "common carriage" requirement for the
postal system - providing for, in marked contrast to the European
model, a categorical right of distribution and a prohibition against any
form of censorship (pp. 88, 95). Third, the United States adopted a
relaxed standard for defamation - centuries before the courts
concluded that the First Amendment demanded one10 - that allowed
truth as a full defense to liability. Notably, this policy arose from the
brilliant defense of publisher John Peter Zenger, in which his lawyer
convinced the jury to nullify the official instructions and acquit Z enger
on the ground that his published allegations that the royal New York
governor had engaged in corruption were true (p. 59).
Finally, in a remarkable policy that turned on its head the
European precedent of taxing newspapers to depress demand for
them, Congress provided for a very cheap rate for mailing newspapers
(pp. 16, 88). The impact of this policy was quite dramatic. In 1832, for
example, newspapers accounted for ninety-five percent of the weight
carried by the postal service, but generated only fifteen percent of its
revenue (p. 90). In terms of readership, the impact was equally
impressive - there were fifty newspaper subscriptions per 100 U.S.
households by the 1820s, netting a subscription rate two to three times
as great as Great Britain's (p. 88).
As Starr explains, the U. S. government's early policy choices (or
"constitutive choices," as Starr terms them) related to the regulation
and promotion of newspapers provided critical support for this
platform technology. But, encouraging the mass adoption of this
technology still required an interested population and the presence of
compelling content (or "killer applications," to use the modem term).
In terms of content, the early American political tradition featured a
series of succinct readable publications to engage the populace with an
opportunity to participate in deliberative and reflective democratic
self-government. From Thomas Paine's Common Sense to the
Declaration of Independence to the Federalist Papers to the
Constitution itself, important materials circulated far and wide among
the American population, often as reprints in newspapers or as
pamphlets (pp. 67, 68, 72). Moreover, in the early competition
between the Jeffersonian Democrats and the Federalist Party (led by
Adams and Hamilton), each of the political parties embraced
newspapers - and set up nationwide newspaper networks - as the

10.

See

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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principal means of building a popular constituency (pp. 84-85). Finally,
in marked contrast to today's environment, the Founders promoted a
very limited view of copyright, which fostered "a competitive market
and broad public domain far more than it protected the interests of
authors" (pp. 1 15-16). Taken together, these conditions help explain
why the literacy rate in the United States outpaced that of its
European counterparts (pp. 105-06).
B.

OfMorse and Bell

The first major revolution in information technology was to deliver
information not by newsprint, but by electric current. Samuel Morse,
an American, gained fame as one of those who discovered that
electrical impulses sent down a wire could be used to relay
information. In Europe, the military, which controlled and managed
the previous form of "telegraph" technology (i.e., the use of
semaphores to relay information visually via encoded signals from one
tower to the next), took control of the invention (pp. 153, 157). In the
United States, however, there was not only an immediate appreciation
for its civilian applications, but also a debate as to whether the
government (which paid Morse to build the first telegraph line) should
manage the technology as part of the postal service (pp. 162-63). In
the 1844 election, which is best known for James Polk's expansionism
(his slogan was "Fifty-four Forty or fight"11), Henry Clay championed
a system of national improvements that included the governmental
control of the telegraph (pp. 163-64). But, in the wake of Polk's
victory, the government stayed out of the telegraph business and
private firms raced to deploy this new technology.
The early development of the telegraph involved cutthroat
competition between rival operators. Unlike a local newspaper that
could cater to select audiences without sacrificing its potential value, a
telegraph operation benefited from a network effect whereby the
value of its business increased with the number of users connected to
its network.12 This dynamic meant that the network which
accumulated the greatest market share - and then refused to
interconnect with rival networks - would be likely to dominate the
market, as customers would migrate in droves to the dominant
network. In the case of the telegraph, Western Union soon benefited

11. The slogan referred to the northern-most part of the boundary of the disputed
Oregon territory, which rested on the 54°40' North latitude line. Ironically, Polk ended up
settling the dispute with respect to the northern boundary and spearheaded a successful
military campaign against Mexico.
12. For a description and discussion of the network-effects phenomenon, see Mark A.
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 479 (1998).
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from this tipping effect just as the Bell System would later benefit
from this dynamic in the early 1900s with regard to the control of
telephony. As to Western Union, however, no antitrust or regulatory
authorities were in place to restrict it from exercising its monopoly
power. As a consequence, Western Union agreed to carry only the
Associated Press ("AP") on its telegraph wires, thereby creating a
monopoly in national news at least until the early 1900s.13
Like the other trusts of the late 1800s, the abusive practices of
Western Union exposed the vulnerability of the American people's
support for unrestrained free enterprise and set the stage for the
emergence of the regulatory state. For starters, regulatory authorities
- often courts, but increasingly regulatory agencies - began to
enforce a commitment to common carriage, thereby barring, for
example, exclusive deals like the one that benefited the Associated
Press (p. 188). Notably, this common carriage requirement did not
require rival telephone networks to interconnect with one another,14
creating a formidable incentive for companies to sign up as many
customers as possible in a given community so that the entire
community would "tip" to it. The Bell System, moreover, enjoyed a
powerful competitive advantage: it made available access to its Long
Lines division only to its local operating companies and not to rival
independent companies (p. 205). Nonetheless, particularly in more
remote areas ignored by the Bell System, the independent companies
made considerable headway in the early 1900s after Bell's patents
expired, and even challenged Bell's dominance by reaching a
penetration level of one-half of the country (p. 205).
To address its increasing business and regulatory challenges, the
Bell System brought in Theodore Vail, a former superintendent of
railway mail in the postal service, who self-consciously modeled the
Bell System on the postal service (p. 207). In particular, the postal
service model gave rise to the slogan of "one system, one policy,
universal service" and the commitment to "a system as universal and
13. P. 186. A landmark antitrust decision further undermined the Associated Press's
entrenched market position. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
14. The distinction between a customer's access to a network and a co-carrier's access to
a network largely reflects (1) where interconnection may occur; (2) whether interconnection
is comparable to what the carrier gives its own affiliates; and (3) what price the carrier may
charge for interconnection. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 196 F. 699, 703 (D.
Wash. 1912) (holding that co-carrier was not entitled to interconnection); see also Inquiry
Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Sys.,
86 F.C.C.2d 469, 'II 56, at 496 (1981) (report and order) (stating that, in mandating
interconnection for cellular providers, "[a] cellular system operator is a common carrier and
not merely a customer" and ordering that interconnection arrangements should be designed
to minimize "unnecessary duplication of switching facilities"); James B. Speta, A Common
Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 258 (2002) (discussing
this issue).
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as extensive as the highway system of the country which extends from
every man's door to every other man's door" (p. 207). As Starr depicts
Vail, his policy of universal service promised a regime of subsidized
telephone service not unlike the cross-subsidies implicit in the postal
system, which charges the same rate for sending a letter from New
York to New Jersey as it does for sending one from New York to
Alaska (p. 446). In this respect, Starr rejects Milton Mueller's
argument that Vail never had in mind the system of cross-subsidies
that has come to pervade our system of telephone service, which
regulators are in the beginning stages of undoing.15
Coupled with his vision of a system serving the public interest, Vail
made peace with the government by accepting a system of regulated
monopoly. This stance gave rise to a regulatory compact whereby a
private monopolist - namely, the Bell System - acted like the postal
service by agreeing to serve all customers in a given area, provided the
monopolist could generate reasonable returns for its shareholders. In
terms of its behavior vis-a-vis the independent providers, Vail also
made peace with the antitrust authorities, agreeing in the Kingsbury
Commitment of 1914 to interconnect its Long Lines division with rival
independent local providers and not to buy any more independent
providers (p. 209). Moreover, as part of a different antitrust
settlement, the Bell System agreed to divest its holdings in Western
Union, thereby ensuring separate ownership of, and intermodal
competition between, the telegraph and telephone networks (p. 209).
The antitrust regulators could have gone farther, however, as they
allowed the Bell System to keep Western Electric (Western Union's
manufacturing arm), thereby enabling it to dominate the equipment
manufacturing business until its breakup in 1984.
Unlike its European counterparts, the United States developed
three alternative modes of communicating over long distances: the
postal service, the Western Union telegraph service, and the Bell
telephone service. In all cases, a distinctly American information
policy promoted mass adoption of the particular technology (in the
case of the Postal service, through subsidization of newspapers, and in
the case of the other two, through early competition). In particular,
this achievement reflected two distinct policy choices. First, in contrast
to the European instinct for placing each service in a single
government bureaucracy that concentrated power over related
technologies, the United States declined to nationalize either the
telegraph or telephone industry (or the radio industry once it
15. As Mueller states, when Theodore Vail cha::npioned "universal service," Vail did
not mean "rate subsidies to make telephone service more affordable"; rather, he meant "the
unification of telephone service under regulated local exchange monopolies." MILTON L.
MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY
IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 92 (1997).
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emerged). Consequently, the United States enjoyed a much more
rapid adoption rate for the new technologies. In the case of telephony,
the results of this strategy were particularly impressive - the
American share of all telephones in the world stood at sixty-seven
percent in 1911 and fifty-nine percent in 1929 (p. 211). In terms of long
distance telephone service, the relative pace of technological change
was even more remarkable: In 1927, it took Bell 1 .5 minutes to place a
long distance call, whereas it took more than an hour to place a call
from Paris to Berlin at that time (p. 211).
The second major policy decision of the United States involved a
series of legal measures - combining both patent and antitrust policy
- to prevent an incumbent platform from gaining control over the
next-generation platform technology. As Starr succinctly explains, an
incumbent provider will often have the incentive to suppress a later
invention that threatens to cannibalize its core product, making new
entrants an important force in developing and deploying such
innovations.16 In terms of patent policy, the United States (as in the
case of copyright) has generally appreciated (although less so in recent
years) the delicate balance between facilitating entry by providing
protection for inventors and not affording an overly broad property
right that could be used to undermine later innovation.17 In the case of
the telegraph, for example, the Supreme Court famously narrowed the
scope of the patent so that it did not sweep in later technological
advancements, notably the telephone.18 Conversely, patent protection
afforded the upstart Bell the opportunity to compete against Western
Union, which launched an aggressive challenge once Bell began
deploying the new technology (p. 196). Moreover, the limited term of
Bell's patent required it to face competition from independent
providers who both raced to deploy new facilities - and thus spurred
greater rates of deployment (p. 210)
as well as to improve on Bell's
product, including innovations like automatic dialing (p. 203). Finally,
antitrust policy enabled the independents to survive (albeit through
oversight late in the competitive process), prevented Bell from
maintaining control of Western Union in addition to its telephone
operations, and deterred Bell from using its network to gain a
dominant position in radio (p. 344).
-

16. P. 193. The cannibalization phenomenon is well explained in CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA (1997).
17. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement In Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997) ("One of the reasons that intellectual property rights are
limited in scope, in duration, and in effect is precisely in order to balance these costs and
benefits."); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
18. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
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M ARKET P OWER AND MAKING S ENSE OF ANTITRUST P OLICY

The history of the information industries narrated by Starr and the
regulatory habits formed from that history continue to hold a strong
grip on economic policymaking. In particular, this legacy explains the
tradition of viewing vertical integration with great skepticism. Before
endorsing this tradition, however, policymakers should consider the
recent economic thinking that suggests that the efficiencies from
vertical integration counsel for greater sympathy to it in analyzing how
to regulate the modem day counterparts to Western Union and the
Bell System (say, SBC and Comcast).
To understand the allure of restricting vertical integration,
consider, for example, an antitrust decree from the late 1940s: the
restriction on motion picture company entry into theater ownership.
After a series of mergers and acquisitions, the motion picture industry
became vertically integrated, with the studios also owning the outlets
for showing the movies it produced. Consequently, if an individual was
interested in seeing a Paramount movie, she would have to go to a
Paramount theatre. This industry structure paralleled the early
structure of the radio industry whereby if an individual was interested
in listening to a broadcast of the World Series carried by the Mutual
Broadcasting Company (as it was in 1939),19 he would need to listen to
a local Mutual affiliate. In many cases, however, this system gave rise
to an unfortunate result: some individuals did not live near a
Paramount theatre or a Mutual affiliate, and, thus, would miss the
movie or the World Series.
The suspicion that vertically integrated companies would engage in
anticompetitive mischief led to an early regulatory consensus in favor
of vertical separation. This consensus, for example, guided the
regulation of radio by the FCC (through the Chain Broadcasting
Rules),20 the regulation of the movie industry (through an antitrust
decree that separated ownership of the theatres from the movie
studios),21 and the regulation of television programming (whereby
programming suppliers could not be owned by broadcast networks
and vice versa).22 Although Starr highlights the penchant for
anticompetitive behavior in the telegraph, telephony, and radio
industries, it would be a mistake to translate this suspicion to these

19. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 199 (1943) (recounting how the 1939 World
Series was not broadcast in markets not reached by the Mutual Broadcasting Company).
20.

Id.

at 224-25 (upholding the Chain Broadcasting Rules); see also p. 380.

21. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (upholding the
antitrust consent decree).
22. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992)
(invalidating financial interest and syndication rules).
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industries' modem counterparts uncritically. In short, the tendency
towards monopoly in those industries may well not apply to today's
market environment and, even where industry concentration is a
concern, the efficiencies created by vertical integration may well
counsel a tolerant regulatory stance, at least in conjunction with a
system of oversight or protective measures.23
In regulatory policy, the suspicion against vertical integration and
the concern that established incumbents will thwart the success of new
upstarts through dodgy, anticompetitive tactics continue to hold a
powerful grip on policymakers. One modem exemplar of vertical
separation is the Computer Inquiry rules, which continue to restrict
the ability of telephone companies to enter into the markets for
"information services."24 Originally, these rules prevented entry
altogether and later authorized such entry only through a structurally
separated affiliate. In essence, this regulatory policy presumed that
local telephone providers would enter into anticompetitive
relationships like that between Western Union and the Associated
Press. Over time, however, the FCC realized that these rules
prevented consumers from benefiting from the significant efficiencies
that vertical integration could bring - for example, the cost savings of
providing voicemail services (an early "information service") through
the same firm that offered telephone service. Consequently, the FCC
ultimately allowed telephone companies to provide information
services, insisting only that they afford common carrier-like access to
their platform for all rivals in the information services market.25
In general, economists have retreated from the early suspicion of
vertical integration drawn from conduct like Western Union's
relationship with AP and Bell's refusal to interconnect its long
distance network with the independent telephone companies' local
networks. Take, for example, the local telephone network, which can

23. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 200-02 (1976); see also Olympia
Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
24. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 431 -35, 450-52 (1980) (final decision)
[hereinafter Computer II], aff'd sub. nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Assoc. v.
FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communication Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267,
270 (1971) (final decision and order) [hereinafter Computer I]. For a discussion of the
Computer Inquiry adjudications, see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER,
DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET
AGE 151-54 (2005).
25. For a discussion of the FCC's revised policy to account for integrative efficiencies,
see Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open A ccess
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003).
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be used to provide voicemail or long distance calls, or to connect to a
subscriber's telephone or computer modem (called "customer
premises equipment"). In general, the owner of the platform
technology (here, the local telephone company) will benefit from the
efficient delivery of complementary applications, removing the need
for any restrictive regulation of their vertical relations in many cases.
Recognizing this benefit, current economic thinking is generally
tolerant of - and often sympathetic to - vertical integration.
The basic intuition behind the argument for greater tolerance of
vertical integration is that a monopolist can reap the entirety of a
monopoly profit in the platform market (say, by marking up the price
of telephone service) and thus has no need to "leverage" its monopoly
into a second market. In addition to this negative argument, a
monopolist actually has a positive incentive not to leverage its
monopoly where it would exclude efficient applications providers (say,
those offering innovative ways to use your telephone) because those
providers will enhance the value of the platform and thus enable the
platform monopolist to reap even greater profits. To be sure, there are
a number of notable exceptions to the principle that a platform
monopolist will embrace efficient competition in the applications
market.26 In particular, the imposition of price regulation in the
platform market gives rise to an incentive for the monopolist to
dominate adjacent markets and reap the monopoly profit in those
markets (as was established in the antitrust litigation against AT&T).27
Similarly, the threat that an entrant in the applications market will
challenge the platform monopoly itself provides a formidable
incentive for the monopolist to prevent successful entry into the
applications market (as was established in the antitrust case against
Microsoft).28 But such exceptions, as antitrust law generally
recognizes, do not warrant categorical suspicion.29
Despite the suggestion that platform providers should welcome
and rely on outside entry into applications markets, many of them
decide to enter such markets themselves. To understand why such
26. For a discussion of this principle and its exceptions, see id.
27. Litton Syss., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983); MCI Communications
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1 105 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
28. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2000) ("In this case,
Microsoft early on recognized middleware as the Trojan horse that, once having, in effect,
infiltrated the applications barrier, could enable rival operating systems to enter the market
for Intel-compatible PC operating systems unimpeded. Simply put, middleware threatened
to demolish Microsoft's coveted monopoly power."), affd, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
29. I say "generally recognizes" because one notable restriction on vertical relations
remains in place: the rule against minimum resale price maintenance. See Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); see also POSNER, supra note 23, at 17778 (criticizing Dr. Miles).
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vertical integration might be efficient, consider the insights of Nobel
Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase related to the importance of
transaction costs.30 In one notable example related to Coase's work, a
platform provider - say, a television network - should be concerned
that applications (in this case, television programs) outside of its
control will be subject to strategic holdout come renegotiation time. In
the language of new institutional economics ("NIE"), the school of
thought that developed the implications of Coase's focus on
transaction costs, this sort of holdout scenario underscores the
challenge of what economists call a "bilateral monopoly"
relationship.31 For NBC, for example, its relationship with Warner
Brothers (which produces ER) poses just this sort of concern. There
are, to be sure, a number of mechanisms for ensuring fair dealing
between applications providers and the platform owner, but one of
them is to increase the closeness of the vertical relationship.
Closer vertical relationships also can be used as a form of risk
sharing between the platform owner and the applications provider.
Consider, for example, the case of the movie theaters and studios
outlined above. In the event that a movie is seen as a risky
proposition, say, because it will require some time for word-of-mouth
support to spur demand, the interests of the theater owners and the
studios will not be aligned. One response to this lack of alignment
would be a special deal to ensure that theater owners are compensated
for their early investment of showing a movie that may not generate
immediate revenue. But the need to continually negotiate such
arrangements may be inefficient (on account of transaction costs),
thereby making the entry of the movie studios in the theater business
(at least through measures like partial ownership) a plausibly
attractive and economically efficient strategy.
The increased sensitivity to the argument that vertical integration
gives rise to undeniable efficiencies is a hallmark of modern antitrust
and regulatory policy. In the case of the television business, for
example, it was the force of this very argument that ultimately led the
FCC (with some j udicial prodding) to lift the restrictive rules
concerning network entry into programming markets, known as the
"finsyn rules."32 In that case, the results were impressive: the
development of a series of new broadcast networks (such as Fox, the
WB, and UPN). But because regimes like finsyn were overly
restrictive and unnecessary does not mean that all concerns about

30.

See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,

31.

See

AND THE LAW (1988).

OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).

32 See Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (invalidating
the finsyn rules).
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vertical integration are entirely off base or that no protective
regulation is ever necessary. It does mean, however, that such
regulations must be tailored carefully to address actual marketplace
harms and not speculative concerns without any basis in fact or
economic theory.
Ill.

P UBLIC OWNERSHIP AND PUBLIC C HOICE THEORY

Starr's narrative underscores a uniquely American approach to
information policy: embracing common-carriage regulation and
resisting public control. In our times, however, this policy is being
tested as advocates of different stripes argue that the American failure
to lead in the adoption of broadband technology stems either from too
much regulation or too little public support. In this Part, I first review
Starr's insights about the role of public regulation and the public
commitment to universal service. After so doing, I then evaluate the
merits of the cases for public ownership of or common-carriage
regulation for broadband platforms.
A.

Universal Service Revisited

As outlined in Part I, Starr argues that Theodore Vail's
commitment to universal service included a vision of subsidized
telephone service. In particular, he points to Vail's commitment to
bringing telephone service "to every man's door" and references in
AT&T's Annual Report to regulated rates that would make available
affordable telephone service for all (p. 446). Starr does not, however,
emphasize a powerful rationale for Vail to have endorsed cross
subsidies as part of his universal service strategy: it constituted a
formidable part of the regulatory compact and long provided Bell with
a powerful defense against competitive entry.33
From the 1 910s until the 1970s, the commitment to use cross
subsidies to ensure affordable telephone service became an important
justification for and goal of public regulation of telephony. To the Bell
System, it also became a valuable counterargument to efforts by
competitors to enter otherwise contestable telecommunications
markets. As AT&T argued, if MCI, for example, was permitted to
enter the high-profit central-district business markets, that entry
would undermine the source of AT&T's cross-subsidy for more
remote areas. Commenting on universal service policy in the 1970s,
Richard Posner highlighted how the Faustian bargain between the
regulators and the incumbent monopolist could be explained by public
33. For a telling of AT&T's abilities in this area, see BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD
BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1978).
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choice theory, namely, the economic analysis of politics. In short, the
incumbent provider's interest in protecting its economic rents
dovetailed with the regulator's interest in protecting subsidized
telephone service through a cross-subsidy regime that was implicit in
the rate structure and thus not necessarily transparent to consumers
who were paying above-cost rates. As Posner put it, this program of
"taxation by regulation" is a form of public finance (i.e., a tax-and
spend program by another name) that deprived consumers of
competition in return for benefits whose costs were not transparent.34
Starting in the 1960s, courts, regulators, and antitrust authorities
began to question the wisdom of the regulatory compact entered into
in the 1910s. In short, this reexamination reflected both the conjecture
that technological change could facilitate new forms of competition
and the insight, largely generated from public choice theory, that
regulation itself distorted markets and deprived consumers of valuable
benefits that competition would bring. The Department of Justice
took the first major step towards a new regime in its antitrust action
against AT&T. Ultimately, this action led to the antitrust court's
judgment that the promotion of universal service goals did not justify
Bell's refusal to interconnect on equal and nondiscriminatory terms.
More fundamentally, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act"),35 Congress undermined Vail's vision altogether by rejecting the
notion of a franchise monopoly - prohibiting state regulators from
barring competition to an incumbent monopolist,36 facilitating entry by
rival upstarts,37 and ordering the transition from an implicit universal
service program to an explicit one.38
The unwinding of an almost century-old system of regulation
continues to involve a series of difficult legal reforms, technological
changes, and marketplace challenges. As Starr might put it,
policymakers are at a crossroads that will afford them the opportunity
to make a series of constitutive choices that will shape the future
structure of the telecommunications industry. Notably, the course of
what legal strategy to pursue involves difficult judgments about the
nature of technological changes, the prospects for marketplace
competition, and optimal network architecture.

34. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 29
(1971).
35. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
36. See 47 U.S.C. § 253.
37. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252.
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 254.
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The Logic in Favor of and Warnings Against Public Control

In enacting the 1996 Act, Congress did not confront the most
important issue now facing telecommunications policy: how to address
the burgeoning broadband market. In 1996, policymakers focused on
the traditional voice telephone market and the Internet barely
registered on their radar screens.39 Consequently, the FCC, the courts,
and other policymakers have struggled to make sense of this new
technology. To put matters simply, and somewhat simplistically given
the availability of hybrid models, policymakers confront at least three
fundamentally different visions of how to regulate this market:
embracing a role for public ownership of (or financing for) the new
broadband infrastructure, regulating this new communications
platform as a common-carrier service akin to traditional telephony, or
developing a new model closer to the Internet's unregulated origins.
In some countries around the world, particularly those where the
government still owns the PTT, the logic for public investment in
broadband technology is either seen as impeccable or unavoidable.
Even in the United States, which has traditionally resisted public
ownership of communications technologies since the issue was
debated in the 1844 presidential election, some have argued for public
financing of the new broadband infrastructure. In particular, a group
of engineers who view fiber optic technology as the ideal mode for
broadband connectivity have endorsed a "new paradigm" of end-user
owned telecommunications whereby the public would finance and
own the broadband facilities.40 As they see it, the network of the
future can be built only if it is recognized as a natural monopoly and
built by the government.
As Starr's account reminds us, the U.S. government did indeed
provide important support for new innovations in information
technology - ranging from providing patent protection for inventions
like the telephone to funding the initial telegraph line. The
government did not, however, ever enter into the communications
business other than to serve as the mail carrier for the country. The
salutary aspect of this policy is that government provision of
telecommunications presents a potential conflict of interest by placing
the police power and its associated regulatory oversight in the hands
of a marketplace competitor. In the case of regulated private

39. Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
1, 11 (2002) ("(T]he Act barely contemplated the importance of the Internet and did not
disturb a category-based regulatory strategy (e.g., one with distinct approaches for
broadcast, cable, and telephone networks)."); id. at 11 n.51 (collecting sources).
40. See
IEEE-USA, REPORT FROM THE WORKSHOP: THE DECADE'S
(R)EVOLUTIONARY TELECOMMUNICATIONS PARADIGM (Mar. 2003), available at http://afn.
johnson.cornell.edu/publish/WSR/WSR.pdf.
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telephone companies, the government may yield to political pressures
and protect incumbents from entry, but it faces only indirect pressures
to do so. Where the government itself is the bureaucracy interested in
avoiding competition, there is a considerable risk that it will use its
police power to protect its investments. The fact that governments can
be tempted into using their monopoly on the police power to
anticompetitive ends should caution them against entering into
markets like broadband. This caution, however, may well not apply
when no private provider is interested in offering service or, as in the
case of the plans by some cities to deliver wireless Internet access, at
least if the cost of delivering the service is quite low and thus unlikely
to trigger this conflict of interest.
The pitfalls of a government policy that limits entry, like the
presence of a monopolist that can act anticompetitively to limit entry,
is that it disrupts the experimentation and technological forces that
characterize competitive markets.41 Even if the market only yields a
single provider, as was the case for the telegraph market and the
market for telephone service for most of the 1900s, the possibility of a
next-generation technology, or a new mode of competition, may either
serve to keep current incumbents on their toes or provide consumers
with considerable benefits. In video markets, for example, broadcast
television initially confronted the competitive threat of cable
television, which itself later faced the entry of satellite television.
Thus, whereby seventy-seven percent of television viewers watched
broadcast television in 1980, only around fifteen percent do today - a
smaller percentage than those who watch satellite television.42
In the video marketplace, new technological innovation continues
to provide consumers with important benefits. Not only did the entry
of satellite television bring important benefits to consumers both in
terms of product quality and reaching those not previously served by
cable providers, it also forced cable providers to upgrade their systems
in response. The economic argument that a next-generation
technology - as opposed to a rival platform using the same
technology - will provide more significant consumer benefits is often

41. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Regulation in Broadband
Communications, in BROADBAND: SHOULD WE REGULATE HIGH SPEED ACCESS? 157, at
177 (Robert W. Crandall & James H. Alleman eds., 2002) (emphasizing that facilities-based
competition provides opportunities for experimentation and facilitates independent
innovation).
42. Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, REASONONLINE, Jan. 2004, at www.reason.
com/0401/fe.bc.domination.shtml ("Today, about 90 percent of households with television
sets subscribe to a multichannel service, primarily cable and DBS, which is up from about 23
percent in 1980."); see also Tenth Annual Report, A nnual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 19 F.C.C.R. 1606, 'll'lI 6, 7,
at 1609-10 (2004).
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associated with the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who
described this process as one of "creative destruction."43 But these
Schumpeterian dynamics could be squelched if today's incumbent can
prevent the deployment of an innovative technology through
anticompetitive conduct (for example, as Microsoft attempted to do
with Netscape's entry into the browser market)44 or if established
incumbents can, as public choice theory would predict, successfully
push for regulation that bars or restricts effective entry (for example,
as the television broadcasters did when faced with the advent of
cable television).45
C.

Wither.Common Carriage?

Aside from whether the government itself should sponsor the
broadband buildout, the second significant regulatory policy question
is whether the common-carriage model developed in the early years of
telephone service should be extended to this new technology.
Although complicated by questions of statutory interpretation and
administrative law, the Supreme Court is now considering this basic
question in Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC. 46 In short, the question for
policymakers is whether the regulatory model used for the telephone
or the one designed for the Internet - or some combination of the
two - is the right fit for regulating broadband Internet access.
I have discussed the law and economics of broadband regulation at
length elsewhere,47 so I will merely point out that the historical pattern
of competition, consolidation, and then regulation may well not hold
in the broadband context. In particular, it is clear that there will be at
least two distinguishing characteristics for broadband platforms vis-a
vis their telephone forbearers: first, there are currently two rival
platforms, DSL and cable modems, with other plausible rivals gearing
up (using different forms of wireless technology); second, there is no
43. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property
COLUM. L. REv. 534, 576-83 (2003) (discussing the Schumpeterian perspective).
34

44. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2000) ,
(D.C. Cir. 2001).

Policy, 103

atfd, 253 F.3d

45. Thomas Hazlett, fo r example, has similarly described this regime as "a textbook
example of anti-competitive regulation." Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the
Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald

HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 420
Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable
Television, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1981, at 77 (criticizing the early regulation of
cable television).
Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on A irwave Allocation Policy, 14

(2001); see also

46. 345 F.3d 1120

(9th Cir. 2003), cert.

granted, 125

S. Ct. 655 (2004).

47. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at chs. 4-6; Farrell & Weiser, supra
note 25; Philip J. Weiser, Toward A Next Generation Regulatory Regime, 35 LOY. L. REV. 41
(2003) [hereinafter Weiser, Next Generation] .
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price regulation of broadband in effect, thereby removing a major
incentive for monopoly leveraging-type behavior. As I have argued
elsewhere, these two important characteristics of broadband suggest
that the FCC should adopt a next-generation regulatory strategy that
would move away from its legacy regulatory strategy to a more
nuanced regulatory model.48 In so doing, regulators should view with
care and skepticism any attempt by broadband providers to justify
discriminatory treatment of unaffiliated content providers, for such
conduct could undermine the Internet's ability to serve as an open
platform for innovation.49
IV.

MAKING SENSE OF THE MEDIA OWNERSHIP DEBATE

For most casual observers of media policy, Starr's intense focus on
the telegraph and telephone may seem like a distraction from the
more familiar issues related to newspapers, radio, and television.
Indeed, the public fascination with the mass media may well explain
why the high-stakes questions of whether to classify broadband as a
common-carrier service eludes public scrutiny and awareness, whereas
the FCC's initiative related to liberalizing the media ownership rules
elicited more public comment than probably all common carrier
related debates combined. The difference in the level of public
controversy may stem from, among other things, the connection that
Americans make between media ownership rules and the editorial
choices related to the content of the programming that they watch.
A.

The Origins and Current Controversies of Media Policy

Unlike telephony, the newspaper, radio, and television industries
have never faced a true common-carriage regime as it would
undermine the very essence of editorial discretion. These media have,
however, confronted regulations aimed at promoting diverse
viewpoints and protecting political speech (p. 371). Traditionally, the
FCC has promoted competition and diversity in the mass media by

48.

See

Weiser, Next Generation, supra note 47.

Lawrence Lessig, Coase's First Question, REGULATION, Fall 2004, at 38, 40-41,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n3/v27n3-4.pdf (analogizing Starr's
recounting of the early years of newspaper delivery to the Internet and praising FCC
Chairman Powell's concern about discriminatory conduct in the broadband environment).
Notably, the term "discrimination" must be defined carefully, as certain forms of
discrimination - using different tiered pricing options, preventing certain uses that might
undermine the quality of service, or engaging in price discrimination (i.e., pricing consumers
according to their willingness to pay) - can be procompetitive. See Weiser, Next Generation,
supra note 47, at 84 n.187 (calling for an evaluation of the justifications fo r discriminatory
treatment before such treatment is condemned).
49.

See

available at
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imposing cross-ownership restrictions between different modes of
communication (such as barring the ownership of a television station
and a newspaper in a particular locality) or even within the same
mode of communication (such as barring the ownership of two major
network stations in a local market). In the case of media ownership
restrictions, the promotion of different viewpoints - i.e., diversity50 provides an additional reason to the competition policy-based logic
for barring common ownership of rival information platforms (such as
the telegraph and the telephone networks). As Starr explains, the
origins of modem broadcast policy date back to the early days of radio
when the FCC promulgated the Chain Broadcasting Rules that
ensured, among other things, that a single company could not own
more than a single network, thereby requiring RCA, which owned
NBC, to spin off what later became ABC {pp. 380-81). In essence,
these rules "aimed to increase competition among networks and to
give local stations some independence - in short, to deny NBC and
CBS the nearly complete dominion over radio they had previously
enjoyed" (p. 381).
In 2003, the FCC reexamined the basis of the current restrictions
on radio and television ownership, and concluded that some of the
restrictions should be repealed.51 This latest rulemaking, which
followed similar efforts to implement the 1 996 Act's deregulatory
instructions, ignited an uproar in Congress and gave rise to a series of
judicial challenges.52 Ultimately, the critics of the FCC's 2003 Media
Ownership Decision convinced both Congress and the Third Circuit to
overturn important parts of the FCC's new rules, requiring the agency
to revisit these issues.53
Part of the challenge for the FCC in revising these rules is that it
must grapple with the reality that Americans often rail against media
concentration in principle, but gravitate towards media conglomerates
in practice. The so-called Big Five media companies, for example,
raise the ire of many concerned citizens who suggest that the Big Five
50. The use of the term "diversity" begs for a definition, as "(d]iversity and its effects
are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone measured." FCC v. Nat'I Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97 (1978). For purposes of this Review, I use the term
to represent different ideological viewpoints. Notably, however, the FCC has, at different
times, also sought to promote diversity of different kinds as well (such as the sources of
programming and the race of station owners).
51. 2002
Ownersh ip

Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Rules and other Rules A dopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the

Telecommunications Act of 1 996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) (report and order) [hereinafter
2003 Media Ownership Decision].

52. For a discussion of the reaction to the FCC's decision, see Ben Scott,
AM. U. L. REV. 645 (2004).

The Politics

and Policy of Media Ownership, 53

53. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99
(2004); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
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wield enormous control over what the public watches on television. In
particular, some argue that the massive popularity of CBSNiacom,
NBC/Universal (owned by General Electric), ABC/Disney, Time
Warner, and News Corp. (which owns Fox) jeopardize a healthy
marketplace of ideas by crowding out other voices. Commissioner
Copps focused on this concern in his dissent from the recent rules,
explaining that these companies "control 70 percent of the prime time
audience. "54 Even if one views this situation as problematic, it is
important to recognize that these five firms only control about twenty
five percent of the total channel capacity, meaning that it is hardly the
case that consumers have no choice other than to watch the
programming produced by the Big Five.
The disconnect between the principle of an equally distributed
media market and the public's propensity to watch programs produced
by the major firms leads some to suggest that government should
police concentration not based on opportunity for diverse information,
but based on actual consumer practice. This is in line with
conventional antitrust policy, but the FCC often seeks to restrict
mergers above and beyond what antitrust law would allow in order to
protect noneconomic (i.e., diversity) concerns. In terms of whether a
multiplicity of voices can thrive and attract attention, the results in the
Internet context are not encouraging. Current surveys, for example,
suggest that the websites controlled by Time Warner, Microsoft, and
Yahoo! each pull in twice the traffic of their closest rivals, even though
other websites are just a click away.55 Perhaps even more telling is the
situation with weblogs, which would appear to be an ideal medium of
making everyone a publisher and providing for an atomistic
marketplace of ideas. On one account, however, interest in
weblogs varies a thousandfold between the most popular ones and the
average ones.56
The best explanation for the imbalance of popular viewing habits
may well not be manipulation or the susceptibility of the public to
advertising (although they may well play a part), but the phenomenon
of network effects. As discussed in Part I, network effects refer to the
fact that the more individuals use a product, the more valuable it is. In
network markets, including television programming (e.g., ABC, NBC,
54. 2003 Media Ownership
Comm'r, dissenting).

Decision, supra

note 51, 18 F.C.C.R. at 13,953 (Copps,

55. Declan McCullagh, FCC debate: ls the Net enough?, CNET NEWS.COM, May 31,
2003, a t http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-1011850.html?tag=ni_print.
56. Clay Shirky, The FCC, Weblogs, and Inequality, Clay Shirky's Writings About the
Internet, at http://www. shirky.com/writings/fcc_inequality.html (first published June 3, 2003);
Services: Top 100 Technorati, Technorati, at http://www.technorati.com/cosmos/toplOO.html
(last updated Jan. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Technorati] .
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CBS, and Fox), websites (e.g., Yahoo! , MSN, and AOL), and weblogs
(e.g., Lawrence Lessig's Blog), size matters because the more people
talk about a phenomenon, the more people want to take part in such
discussions. In the case of the major networks, for example, consider
the success of reality shows like American Idol or Survivor, which
depend on "buzz" that generates conversations about them and leads
to increased viewership. Similarly, the Volokh Conspiracy weblog
(ranked 35 by the number of links to it57) generates lots of discussion
about legal issues because that is where lots of people discuss them.
Quite fittingly, the leading Internet search engine, Google, both
reflects and reinforces the already-strong network-effect position of
popular websites or biogs by arranging the order of search requests by
how many other users have linked to the site that falls within the scope
of the request.58
Before leaving the point about why the most popular sources for
news and information are durably popular, one theory related to
network effects warrants consideration. This theory, which one author
has dubbed the "paradox of choice," suggests that even where people
claim they want choice, the large number of choices available to them
actually cause consternation and confusion.59 One response to this
dilemma is to rely on information-saving shortcuts (rather than suffer
information overload), leading viewers, for example, to watch those
same popular programs that their friends are watching, particularly
when lots of other choices are available.ro In short, the difficulties of
choosing among a large number of possibilities - i.e., almost a third
of American consumers complain about the volume of media choices
available to them61 - can be another reinforcing dynamic behind the
power of network effects in the mass media. Or, as Nobel Laureate
Herbert Simon predicted in 1970, "when information is plentiful,
attention will be scarce. "62
57.

Technorati, supra

note 56.

58. Some have cited this feature as a dangerous force for centralization of information
on the Web. See Mathew Hindman & Kenneth Neil Cukier, More ls Not Necessarily Better,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2004, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/23/opinion/
23hindman.html.
59. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE (2004).
60. Another technologically driven response is to rely on the shortcuts suggested
through algorithms used by Tivo and NetFlix, which make suggestions for a viewer based on
what he liked previously and what others with the same interests enjoyed. Whether or not
this search cost-savings device will be less likely to drive viewers to as narrow a set of options
as the network-effects phenomenon remains to be seen.
61. Joe Mandese, Study: Media Overload On The Rise, TELEVISION WK., May 17, 2004,
at 21, available at http://www.tvweek.com/planning/051704study.html (last visited Dec.- 18,
2�.
62. Philip Meyer, Journalism Must Evolve - and Quickly, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 2004,
at A21, available at http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20040923/oplede23.art.htm.
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The Future of Media Policy and Revisiting Past Constitutive
Choices

What can we learn from reflecting on network effects and the
power of major networks? First off, the effort to maintain and regulate
artificial scarcity - a tempting thought for victims of information
overload or those who regard the Golden Age of television as the
1960s when TV programs were better and the news was more elevated
- denies technological reality and would be legally unsustainable.
Second, it is important to appreciate that we now have more diversity
than ever in that the ability of a single TV show or newscast to gamer
forty-five percent of the audience has been relegated to history.
Rather, with the prime-time audience for cable television networks
now surpassing those watching all of the major broadcast networks
and the Internet competing with television for attention "in the
market for eyeballs," citizens face a multiplicity of choices. Indeed,
part of the challenge of the emerging telecommunications marketplace
- in the cases of telephone service, Internet offerings, and video
programs - is that people are forced to make choices where they
previously lived, often comfortably, in a world of regulated scarcity.
In terms of its policy implications, the changing marketplace does
not mean that there is no role for a public interest compass in media
policy. Or, to use Cass Sunstein's formulation, it is indeed true that
"[t]here is a large difference between the public interest and what
interests the public" and that the media should be used to "promote
the American aspiration to deliberative democracy. "63 The problem
with the legacy model of media policy is that it expects that
commercial broadcasters can be effectively regulated to, for example,
cover political news in a thoughtful and robust fashion or to develop
and air educational programming for children. Like the universal
service policy based on the use of cross-subsidies, the promotion of
public interest programming in return for the use of free spectrum
licenses is a form of "taxation by regulation." A key difference
between the universal service regime and the public interest
obligations imposed on television broadcasters is that, in the rnid1 990s, policymakers upped the ante in the television context by
awarding a second set of licenses to broadcasters to use while they
transition their customers (only about fifteen percent of the viewing
public) to digital television.

63. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2000);
Mark Cooper, Open Communications Platforms: The Physical Infrastructure As The
Bedrock of Innovation and Democratic Discourse in the Internet Age, 2 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 177, 193 (2003) (arguing that speech is not just "an economic commodity").
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Like the universal service regime borne in a world of regulated
scarcity, the current system of broadcast regulation is under great
strain in a new marketplace environment. First, this model,
particularly with the second set of licenses used by the broadcasters
during the digital transition, is a major cause of the United States'
economically inefficient use of spectrum.64 Second, this model, like
other taxation by regulation regimes, invites and encourages heavy
investments in lobbying and political gamesmanship that often mean
that the public interest goals supposedly served by it are highly
unlikely to be achieved in a robust fashion.65 Finally, this model both
relies on and encourages the continuation of the increasingly shaky
"scarcity" rationale that explains why broadcasters cannot invoke the
First Amendment to challenge public interest regulations that could
not, for example, be imposed on their newspaper brethren under the
same amendment.66
Just in time for the current model of broadcast regulation to begin
collapsing under its own weight, Starr's The Creation of the Media
reminds us that there is a better model for ensuring public interest
goals. In particular, Starr reports that policymakers faced a critical
constitutive choice during the radio industry's formative years when
noncommercial and commercial radio stations alike were clamoring
for spectrum to air programming. Perhaps reflecting the zeitgeist of
the 1920s, the Federal Radio Commission - which was established in
1927 before being folded into the FCC in 1 934 - began its control
64. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at ch. 7; Thomas Hazlett & Gregory
Rosston, Wh y the A irwaves Should Be Deregulated, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 11, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/2102-1039_3-5156846.html (explaining that EU countries have about
twice as much spectrum available to cellular carriers as the US).

65. As James Surowiecki recently reported:
Commendable as [the public interest system of broadcast regulation] may seem, it has very
little to do with the business of broadcast television. Today, most Americans - ninety per
cent or so - have cable or satellite TV. The airwaves are used less and less. Nor is there any
evidence that the public interest is better served by broadcasters than by cable channels.
That the major networks showed just an hour of coverage per night of the national political
conventions suggests that it is not. (And it's unclear who is to blame, exactly, for the fact that
two out of five Americans think Saddam Hussein was behind the September 11th attacks.) If
people would rather watch an episode of "Survivor" than a speech by Al Gore, the network
will air "Survivor." This is a sound business decision. But taxpayers shouldn't be footing the
bill for it.
James Surowiecki, Free A ir, NEW YORK�R, Oct. 18, 2004, at 60, available at http://www.
newyorker.com/printable/?talk?/041018ta_talk_surowiecki (last visited Dec. 18, 2004).
66. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the right of
reply regulations imposed on television broadcasters), with Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating the right of reply regulations imposed on
newspapers). For a critique of this line of doctrine, see Phil Weiser, Promotinf( Informed
Deliberation and a First A mendment Doctrine for a Dif(ital Af(e: Towards a New Ref(ulatory
Ref(ime for Broadcast Ref(ulation, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE MEDIA 11, 12-

13 (Simone Chambers & Anne Costain eds., 2000); Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical
97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 944 (1997).
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over the airwaves by preferring commercial stations greatly over their
noncommercial counterparts, resulting in a two-thirds drop in the
number of nonprofit stations from 1927 to 1930 alone (p. 352). The
Radio Commission disdained the nonprofit stations because it viewed
them as (1) "propaganda" stations that could not be trusted to serve
the public interest and (2) incapable of delivering powerful signals that
could be transmitted far and wide (pp. 351-52). In 1932, when asked by
the Senate to explain its reluctance to support nonprofit stations, the
Commission explained that "educational programs can be safely left to
the voluntary gift of the use of facilities by commercial stations" (p.
358). This perspective, although not conceived of in these precise
terms, laid the groundwork for a regulatory regime that would
mandate and oversee such "gifts" by commercial providers.
Like the case of the unregulated monopoly possessed by Western
Union, the development of America's system of radio broadcasting
failed to ensure the best possible use of the medium. In particular,
other countries that made the formative decisions related to radio
slightly after the United States did (i.e., in the 1930s as opposed to the
1920s), made very different decisions about how to foster the growth
of radio broadcasting. In particular, Australia and Canada both took a
more hybrid path than the United States, supporting both profit and
nonprofit stations. In Canada, the government supported a system of
public broadcasting in the 1930s, enabling the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation to develop a national network of stations and a national
identity separate from the type of programs that CBS and NBC would
offer (pp. 361-62). In Australia, the government not only assigned
spectrum licenses to nonprofit providers, but also used the fees paid
on radio receivers to support public radio stations (p. 362). In
evaluating the path the United States took vis-a-vis Canada and
Australia, Starr does not hide his wistfulness for the path not taken.
Moreover, Starr underscores both the potential viability of this
alternative path as well as the difficulty of reversing course once the
broadcasters gained significant political power (that limited,
for example, Roosevelt's willingness to change course) and became
embedded in the public consciousness as the providers of
broadcast programming.67
Despite its history, the United States can still correct its missed
opportunity to promote public broadcasting and a stronger
commitment to community stations. On the public broadcasting front,
the United States finally did create the framework for such a system in
the 1960s, with a Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a National
67. For another argument along these lines, see ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH
MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLffiCS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 226-40 (1999)
(arguing that commercial interests undermined the opportunities for public media).
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Public Radio network, and a Public Broadcasting System. In so doing,
it laid the groundwork for a better system of ensuring true public
interest programming, particularly by providing a noncommercial
alternative that would not respond to the marketplace pressures that
are, in the opinion of many, compromising the quality of news and
leading the major networks to avoid coverage of political events.68
Moreover, with the transition to digital television underway and a
second license in the hands of each broadcaster, the U.S. government
faces an opportunity to develop a revenue source for public
broadcasting and to facilitate more efficient uses of spectrum in one
stroke: enable the public broadcasters to return their licenses for
auction ahead of their private brethren and use the added revenue to
endow public broadcasting.69
In terms of .supporting local stations, changes in technology now
make it possible to grant additional "low power" licenses to stations
operated by community organizations. Unfortunately, the FCC's
effort to promote such stations several years back ran into the
lobbying might of the commercial broadcasters and was reversed in
Congress. But the claims of interference raised by the broadcasters,
which were dubious at the time, were rejected entirely by an
independent study, and some in Congress are pushing for a reversal of
course on the matter.70 Moreover, the Internet's ability to serve as an
open medium for delivering information via weblogs, websites, and
listserves is only beginning to be utilized. Ultimately, the Internet may
well prove vital in expanding the marketplace of ideas. Notably, unlike
traditional media, the Internet provides extraordinarily low entry
barriers and is highly interactive, with over forty percent of all
Internet users sharing information with others online.71 Indeed, the
68. Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 341, 362-66 (1998); Norris Dickard, Powell Muses: Maybe Public Broadcasting
Can Help!, CURRENT, Sept. 22, 2003, available at http://www.benton.org/publibrary/
issuesinfocus/pubcasting.htrnl; see also Ellen Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box:
Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1389 (2005).
69. Indeed, the Association of Public Television Stations has made just this argument.
See, e.g., Completing the Digital Television Transition: Hearing on S.R. 253 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. , & Transp., 108th Cong. (June 9, 2004) (statement of John M.
Lawson, President and CEO, Association of Public Television Stations), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=l220&wit_id=3514. For a scholarly
explanation of this point, see Goodman, supra note 68, at 1467-71. See also Geller, supra
note 68, at 362-66 (proposing a trust fund approach).

70.

See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra

note 24, at 241.

71. See Kevin Kelly, The Web Runs on Love, No t Greed, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2002, at AS
(noting that seventy percent of the then-three million web sites were built by individuals'
desire to share ideas, not to make money); Amanda Lenhart et al., Pew Internet &
American Life Project, Content Creation Online (Febru�ry 29, 2004), available at
http://www .pewintemet.org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Content_Creation_Report.pdf.
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Internet is already facilitating an increasing array of civic-minded,
locally oriented publications that are providing "a sense of civic
involvement for people who have felt shut out of their own local
politics and media. "72
C ONCLUSION

Paul Starr's The Creation of the Media is an important reminder of
the role that public policy plays in shaping the development of
communication technologies and the structure of the information
industries. His careful historical documentation, thoughtful analysis,
and effective comparative case studies all underscore that
policymakers confront the opportunity to make constitutive choices.
Taken together, these choices - often not viewed together as part of a
coherent strategy because of their separate legal pedigrees - account
for a generally successful American information policy, which spurred
substantially higher literacy rates, earlier adoption of telephone
service, and a greater tradition of localism in media than its European
counterparts. For policymakers and general readers alike, Starr's
narrative is not only compelling, but an important counterbalance to
the unfortunate reality that telecommunications policy is often, as
Nicholas Lemann put it, "an insider's game, less because the players
are secretive than because the public and the press - encouraged by
the players, who speak in jargon - can't get themselves interested."73
The eloquence of Starr's prose and lucidity of his analysis underscore
why information policy is a subject that should be of interest to all
Americans, and that Americans have a proud tradition to live up to in
confronting future policy challenges.
Looking forward, policymakers are well advised to be careful
about what lessons to draw from looking in the rear-view mirror. In a
one-wire world, as telephony was for most of the 1900s, the common
carrier model of regulation and the concomitant use of cross-subsidies
to achieve universal service goals constituted a reasonably effective
public policy. The broadband world, however, will feature at least two
wires and quite possibly more. Moreover, broadband will not be
subject to rate regulation, meaning that the incentive for a regulated
monopolist to extract its monopoly profits from adjacent markets will
not motivate monopoly leveraging-type conduct. Consequently,
policymakers should be hesitant to presume before the fact that such
behavior will occur and restrict vertical relations on that ground.
72. Mark Glaser, The New Voices: Hyperlocal Citizen Media Sites Want You (to Write) !,
USC ANNENBERG ONLINE JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 26, 2004, at http://www.ojr.org/ojr/
stories/041026glaser.
73. Nicholas Lemann,

The Chairman,

NEW YORKER, Oct. 7, 2002, at 48.
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As to media policy, The Creation of the Media underscores that
policymakers can reevaluate the constitutive choice made during
radio's formative years and consider a new path appropriate for
today's technological environment. In particular, rather than attempt
to force the major broadcasters to take their public interest obligations
more seriously (say, through a reimposition of the long abandoned
Fairness Doctrine), policymakers would do well to promote and
protect public broadcasting, low-power radio, and Internet weblogs,
all of which are far more vibrant media for true localism and diversity
than the major networks ever will be. Ironically, as public choice
theory would predict, many policymakers and regulated titans will
resist this path, as it would bring an end to the public interest benefits
and regulatory controls that policymakers can claim credit for under
the current system. Moreover, many regulated companies will also
resist change (say, to spectrum policy) insofar as the proposed reforms
may well stimulate new forms of competition, such as low-power
radio. But, as Starr reminds us, the current model of media policy (and
uses of spectrum) is by no means preordained and thus can be
reconsidered. Consequently, when Congress reconsiders some of the
regulatory policies embedded in today's industry structure as part of
its reevaluation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, it would do
well to heed Starr's reminder and take the opportunity to devise a
sound information policy for the Internet age.

